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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF GEORGETOWN STEEL CORP. V.
UNITED STATES ON NONMARKET ECONOMY
IMPORTS
Richard N. Eid*
INTRODUCTION
Foreign industrial competition increasingly threatens industry in the
United States." Media attention2 focuses on the fact that United States
companies have been unable to modernize and compete with lower
priced foreign imports.3 Consequently, United States companies have
been seeking legislative relief to curtail the damage foreign imports
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Comment, U.S. Legislative Import Relief Options: A Comparision of Proce-
dures, 13 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 1049, 1049 (1981) [hereinafter Comment, Import
Relief Options]; see also Thurow, America Among Equals, in ESTRANGEI.MEN1r
AMERICA AND THE WORLD 163-66 (S. Unger ed. 1985) (noting the decrease in United
States economic strength and productive efficiency compared to other countries; Ken-
nedy, The (Relative) Decline of America, ATLANTIC, Aug. 1987, at 29-30 (noting the
relative decline of United States industrial and manufacturing output); S.D. COHEN,
THE MAKING OF U.S. INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC POuCY 207 (3d ed. 1987) (showing
the decline of the United States manufacturing sector and global competitiveness and
the increase of imports into the United States); D. MILLER, INDUSTRIAL IMPORT
SHOCK: POLICY CHALLENGE OF THE 1980'S 1-62 (1985) (describing the decline of
United States industrial competitiveness and output).
2. Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1049; see also Chirello, For-
eign Rivals Imperil U.S. Firms' Leadership in the Service Sector, Wall St. J., Mar. 21,
1988, at I, col. 6 (discussing foreign technological advances in the service industry, and
how such advances have made global expansion easier); Rowen, Legislation No Solu-
tion to Trade Deficit, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (discussing the inability
of United States industry to compete with foreign countries); Auerbach, Senate Panel
Seeks Japan Sanction, Wash. Post, Mar. 12, 1987, at El, col. 3 (noting the failure of
Japan to maintain its semiconductor trade agreement, and discussing the Japanese
practice of dumping computer chips in the United States and abroad at less than fair
market value).
3. Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1049; see also Note, Protect-
ing Steel: A Time for a New Approach, 96 HARV. L. REV. 866, 877 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Note, Protecting Steel] (examining the inability of the United States steel industry
to modernize and maintain efficient plants vis-a-vis foreign competition).
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cause.
4
One of the most confusing import relief issues concerns the redress
that United States businesses seek against communist or nonmarket
economies (NMEs). Complications arise in transactions with NMEs
because a NME has no supply and demand forces, thus, creating diffi-
culty in deriving the value of NME products.6 Until recently, courts
used the antidumping law,7 countervailing duty law,8 and section 4061
4. Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1049; see also Jackson, Per-
spectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade: Costs and Benefits of Legal
Procedures in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1570, 1574-75 (1984) (discussing
the regulation of imports through legislative relief options). The clear trend of statutes
Congress has enacted is toward a greater "legalization" or "judicialization" of the sys-
tem, which serves to accelerate and facilitate judicial recourse to nontariff measures for
restraining imports. Id. at 1573.
5. See Sandler, Primer on U.S. Trade Remedies, 19 INT'L LAW. 763, 766 (1985)
(citing the complexities inherent in import legislation involving Communist countries);
Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S. Antidumping/Counter-
vailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807, 817-25 (1984) (discussing import relief mea-
sures involving NMEs); Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1049-50
(discussing the confusing array of remedies available to United States companies seek-
ing relief against communist countries).
6. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (stating that subsidies cannot be measured without a market economy); Horlick
& Shuman, supra note 5, at 808-09 (discussing the problems countries with NMEs
caused in drafting trade legislation).
7. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The United States assesses
an antidumping duty on imports sold at a price lower than fair value. Id. § 1673. The
antidumping statute states:
If-
(1) the administering authority determines that a class or kind of foreign mer-
chandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the United States at less than its fair
value, and
(2) the Commission determines that -
(A) an industry in the United States
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially
retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of
sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise an antidumping
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, in an amount equal to
the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United
States price for the merchandise.
Id. § 1673.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982); 19 U.S.C. § 1671-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The United States imposes countervailing duties when foreign governments convey sub-
sidies to exporters that result in lower-priced goods. Id. § 1671(a). The countervailing
duty statute states:
If-
(1) the adminiftering authority determines that-
(A) a country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corpora-
tion, association, or other organization organized in such a country,
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of the Trade Act of 1974 as the primary remedies in import relief situ-
ations. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, however, limited the applica-
tion of these options when it held that the countervailing duty law is
inapplicable to NMEs because the statute encompasses only market
economy subsidies. 10
This Note focuses on the decision of the court in Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States and its effect on available import remedies. Part
I provides a brief overview of the law on import relief. Part II examines
the case history of Georgetown Steel and the court's reasons for pro-
scribing the use of the countervailing duty law. Part III criticizes the
analysis of the court in light of case law precedent and statutory laws.
is providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manufac-
ture, production, or exportation of a class or kind of merchandise im-
ported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation, into the United
States, and
(2) the Commission determines that
(A) an industry in the United States -
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially
retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise, or by reason of
sales (or the likelihood of sales) of that merchandise for importation,
then there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing
duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of
the net subsidy.
Id.
9. 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982). Under section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974, the two
part process leading to an award of import relief begins with an ITC finding that im-
ports cause serious injury. Id. Section 406 provides:
(1) Upon the filing of a petition by an entity described in section 2251(a)(1) of
this title, upon request of the President or the United States Trade Representa-
tive, upon resolution of either the Committee on Ways and Means of the House
of Representatives or the Committee on Finance of the Senate, or on its own
motion, the International Trade Commission (hereafter in this section referred to
as the "Commission") shall promptly make an investigation to determine, with
respect to imports of an article which is the product of a Communist country,
whether market disruption exists with respect to an article produced by a domes-
tic industry.
(3) The Commission shall report to the President its determination with respect
to each investigation under paragraph (1) and the basis therefor and shall in-
clude in each report any dissenting or separate views. If the Commission finds, as
a result of its investigation, that market disruption exists with respect to an arti-
cle produced by a domestic industry, it shall find the amount of the increase in,
or imposition of, any duty or other import restriction on such article which is
necessary to prevent or remedy such market disruption and shall include such
finding in its report to the President.
Id. § 2436(a).
10. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
1988]
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Part IV discusses the effectiveness of the remaining remedial trade
statutes. Part V proposes that to provide the most effective remedy for
NME import situations, Congress should repeal the antidumping law
and refine section 406.
I. OVERVIEW OF IMPORT RELIEF
Georgetown Steel involved a complex and unsettled area of interna-
tional trade. No case prior to Georgetown Steel specifically addressed
whether the countervailing duty law was applicable to countries with
NMEs. 11 Previous courts had held that the United States may counter-
vail subsidies from countries with a highly centralized government.1"
The court in Georgetown Steel, however, explicitly ruled for the first
time on the applicability of the countervailing duty law to countries
with NMEs.
In addition to the Georgetown Steel decision on the application of
the countervailing duty law, congressional actions have affected the im-
port relief laws. 13 First, Congress amended the antidumping law in
1974 and 1979 to respond more effectively to the economic realities of
NMEs.14 Unfortunately, congressional attempts were futile as the an-
tidumping law became a confusing and elusive statute, resulting in in-
consistent decisions.
Second, Congress added section 406 of the 1974 Trade Act15 to pro-
vide an additional safeguard to domestic industries.16 Specifically, the
act provided relief from rapidly increasing imports from NME coun-
tries, regardless of fairness.1 7 As with the antidumping law, section 406
is a confusing alternative.' 8 To date, no domestic company has suc-
11. See Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 555 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985) (stating that although previous judicial proceedings did not address the
applicability of the countervailing duty law to countries with NMEs, judicial proceed-
ings have involved states with complete control over industries), revd sub nom. Ge-
orgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
12. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussing two cases in which
courts applied the countervailing duty law to situations where foreign governments
heavily regulated the markets).
13. See infra note 52 (setting forth recent relevant amendments to trade
legislation).
14. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 808-09 (tracing the development and
rationale of the antidumping act).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
16. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 811 (noting that Congress recognized
that the United States could not apply the antidumping law effectively to imports from
NMEs).
17. See Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note I, at 1052 (noting that a
petitioner is not required to show that an unfair trade practice exists).
18. See infra notes 133-55 and accompanying text (discussing the details of section
[VOL. 3:65
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ceeded in a section 406 proceeding."9
II. CASE HISTORY OF GEORGETOWN STEEL
A. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
The appellees, Georgetown Steel Corporation, Raritan River Steel
Company and Atlantic Steel Company (collectively, Georgetown
Steel), and Continental Steel Corporation (Continental Steel), filed two
countervailing duty petitions with the International Trade Administra-
tion (ITA) in November 1983 on behalf of domestic producers of car-
bon steel wire rod.2 0 Georgetown Steel and Continental Steel claimed
that the Czechoslovakian and Polish governments had subsidized car-
bon sfeel wire rod imported into the United States and, therefore, the
United States should impose countervailing duties under section 303 of
the Tariff Act of 1930.21 The petitioners claimed that the following
acts of the foreign government were subsidies: (1) the benefit of ex-
change rates higher than the official rates, (2) the receipt of direct pay-
ments on goods sold abroad at prices below domestic prices, (3) the
exporting entity's retention of part of the "hard currency" obtained
from nonmarket export sales, (4) the application of trade conversion
coefficients to change the exchange rate providing a more favorable re-
turn on exports, and (5) the granting of income tax rebates for such
sales.2"
The ITA instituted countervailing duty investigations based on the
406).
19. Rosen & Benjamin, Appeals Court Ends Longstanding Debate on Tariff Act's
Scope, Legal Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at 18, col. 1; see also Recent Development, Relief
from Imports from Communist Countries: The Trials and Tribulations of Section
406, 13 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 617, 619 n.18 (1981) [hereinafter Recent Develop-
ment, Relief from Imports] (noting that at least until 1981, no appeals court heard a
section 406 case).
20. Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Czech., 49 Fed. Reg. 19,370, 19,371 (ITA 1984)
(final negative countervailing duty determination) [hereinafter Wire Rod from Czech.],
rev'd sub nom. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), revd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Carbon Steel Wire Rod from Pol., 49 Fed. Reg. 19,374, 19,375 (ITA
1984) (final negative countervailing duty determination) [hereinafter Wire Rod from
Pol.], rev'd sub nom. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d
1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (stating
that a countervailing duty proceeding begins when a party, on behalf of an industry,
files a petition with the administering authority alleging the requirements for imposi-
tion of the duty).
21. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,371; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375.
22. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,370; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375.
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
petitioners' five subsidy allegations.13 After an investigation of the com-
plaints and a hearing, the ITA concluded that no subsidies existed be-
cause the Czechoslovakian and Polish wire rod exports had not received
any countervailable subsidies. 4 Based on this reasoning, the ITA dis-
missed a similar investigation initiated by AMAX Chemical Corpora-
tion and Kerr-McGee against the Soviet Union and the German Demo-
cratic Republic. 5
The ITA held that section 303 did not apply to imports from NMEs
because a subsidy can have no meaning in an economy that does not
have true market forces .2 The ITA defined a subsidy as a transaction
that alters the market procedure, causing economic problems in pro-
duction and resource allocation leading to a reduction in world
wealth.2 7 Consequently, the ITA concluded that the concept of subsi-
dies was inapplicable in an economy that had no markets.2 8 Ge-
orgetown Steel Corporation and Continental Steel Corporation asked
the Court of International Trade (CIT) to review the negative finding
of the ITA, while AMAX Chemical and Kerr-McGee, whose petition
23. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,371; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (stating
that the administering authority shall determine whether a reasonable basis exists to
believe or suspect that a government is providing a subsidy). If the administering au-
thority makes a positive determination, it shall include an estimate of the net subsidy.
id.
24. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,374; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,378.
25. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 549 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308(Fed. Cir. 1986). While the ITA was considering the wire rod cases, AMAX Chemical,
Inc. and Kerr-McGee Chemical Corporation filed petitions with the ITA alleging that
the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic had provided subsidies for
potash the two countries imported into the United States. See Potassium Chloride from
the Soviet Union, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428, 23,428 (ITA 1984) (rescission of initiation of
countervailing duty investigation and dismissal of petition) [hereinafter Potash from
U.S.S.R.] (holding that the petitions of AMAX Chemical and Kerr-McGee to counter-
vail against Soviet exporters were invalid, because the Soviet Union is a NME); Potas-
sium Chloride from the German Democratic Republic, 49 Fed. Reg. 23,428, 23,428(ITA 1984) (rescission of initiation of countervailing duty investigation and dismissal
of petition) [hereinafter Potash from E. Ger.] (holding that the petitions of AMAX
Chemical and Kerr-McGee to countervail against East German exporters were invalid,
because the German Democratic Republic is a NME). After deciding the wire rod
cases, the ITA dismissed the investigation of the Soviet Union and the German Demo-
cratic Republic because both countries had NMEs and, therefore, section 303 did not
apply. Potash from U.S.S.R., supra, at 23,428; Potash from E. Ger., supra, at 23,428.
26. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,371; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375.
27. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,371; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375.
28. Wire Rod from Czech., supra note 20, at 19,371; Wire Rod from Pol., supra
note 20, at 19,375.
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the ITA dismissed based on the same grounds," also appealed the dis-
missal of their petitions. The CIT consolidated these cases."
B. THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The CIT reversed the ITA and held that the countervailing duty law
applies to exports from NMEs3 1 The ITA held that the purpose of the
statute is to extract subsidies from entering commerce and to protect
domestic industry from the effects of subsidies. 2 The CIT, however,
determined that the ITA erred in its conclusion that a subsidy cannot
exist in a NME, and that the ITA decision contradicted the plain
meaning of the statute.3 3 The CIT stated that the countervailing duty
29. See supra note 25 (discussing the potash cases).
30. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
31. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 557 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
32. Id. at 553. The court stated that the countervailing duty law makes no distinc-
tions based on the economy of a country. Id. at 550. The ultimate question concerns
the conveyance of a bounty or grant, not a market base of the economy. Id. The lan-
guage of the statute clearly establishes a theoretical ideology. Id. The relevant lan-
guage of section 1303 that discusses this theory is the following: "Whenever any coun-
try, dependency, colony, province, or other political subdivision of government, person,
partnership, association, cartel, or corporation shall grant or bestow .... " 19 U.S.C.§ 1303(a)(1) (1982).
33. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 550 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308(Fed. Cir. 1986). The CIT held that the countervailing duty law contained in 19
U.S.C. § 1303 governed the proceedings in Georgetown Steel because the agreement
did not include the countries producing the products within the meaning of section
1671(b). Id. According to section 1671(b), a "country under the Agreement" means a
country
(I) between the United States and which the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures applies, as determined under § 2503(b) of this title,(2) which has assumed obligations with respect to the United States which arc
substantially equivalent to obligations under the Agreement, as determined by
the President, or(3) with respect to which the President determines that -
(A) there is an agreement in effect between the United States and that
country which -
(i) was in force on June 19, 1979, and
(ii) requires unconditional most-favored-nation treatment with
respect to articles imported into the United States,
(B) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does not apply betwecn
the United States and that country, and
(C) the agreement described in subparagraph (A) does not expressly per-
mit -
(i) actions required or permitted by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade or required by the Congress, or
(ii) nondiscriminatory prohibitions or restrictions on importation
which are designed to prevent deceptive or unfair practices.
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
law does not make distinctions based on the form of the economy of a
country34 and, therefore, the ITA concluded incorrectly that the coun-
tervailing duty law cannot apply to countries with NMEs.35 The CIT
remanded the cases to the ITA for further proceedings consistent with
its opinion. 6
C. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
At the outset, the court's analysis focuses on the claims of Kerr-Mc-
Gee and AMAX Chemical regarding potash imported from the Soviet
Union and German Democratic Republic, and not on Georgetown
Steel's claim regarding the wire rod imported from Poland and Czecho-
slovakia. The Federal Circuit vacated the order of the CIT with respect
to Georgetown Steel based on a lack of jurisdiction.31 Because the facts
of both cases are virtually identical, this decision does not affect the
analysis of the court of appeals with respect to the applicability of
countervailing duties to NMEs.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected the CIT deci-
19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982).
Finding that the countries involved fell outside of this definition meant only that the
assessment of countervailing duties would not require an injury determination if the
administering authority found that a bounty or grant existed. Continental Steel Corp.
v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 550 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), revd sub nom. Ge-
orgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Section 303
generally does not require that subsidized imports injure a domestic industry before the
government imposes countervailing duties. Id. at 551. If the international obligations of
the United States, such as Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
demand otherwise, however, section 303(a)(2) will apply and the administering author-
ity must make an injury determination. Id. at 556.
Outside of the injury determination aspect, sections 303 and 1671 are identical and
can be used interchangeably. Thus, the analytical problems discussed below apply with
equal weight to both statutes. Id. at 556-57.
34. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 550 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nora. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
35. Id. at 557.
36. Id.
37. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
1986). Georgetown Steel mailed the complaint to the clerk within 30 days of the filing
of the summons, but because there was insufficient postage, the summons was returned
to Georgetown Steel and, therefore, was not timely filed. Id.; see Tariff Act of 1930, §
516A, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) (requiring that a party
appealing to the CIT must file a summons within 30 days of the date of publication in
the Federal Register and then file a summons within 30 days of the complaint). Rule
5(g) of the Rules of the Court of International Trade provides that a party completes a
filing by mail when the CIT receives the complaint with the proper postage affixed. See
Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (dis-
cussing the filing requirements of the CIT). The Court of Appeals concluded that the
complaint was not timely filed as it was not mailed "with proper postage affixed" until
43 days after the summons was filed. Id.
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sion and held that the countervailing duty law does not apply to
NMEs.38 Initially, the court focused on the implication of the statutory
intent of the countervailing duty law codified in section 303 of the
Tariff Act of 1930."' The court determined that the purpose of the
countervailing duty law4" and recent legislative actions were inconsis-
tent with their applicability to imports from NMEs.4 1 Finally, the court
held that a "subsidy" cannot exist in a country without a market-based
economy.4
2
First, the court held that the Tariff Act has remained unchanged
since the time of its original enactment in 1897 - a time when NMEs
did not exist.4 3 Congress, therefore, did not address the issue of the
presence of a market in drafting section 303. Since that time, Congress
has reenacted section 303 six times without making any significant
changes relating to NMEs.44 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
38. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
39. Id. at 1314 (citing Tariff Act of 1930 § 303, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1303
(1982)).
40. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314-17 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (providing the proce-
dures for obtaining relief under the countervailing duty law).
41. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
42. Id. at 1318.
43. Id. at 1314. The original statute provided that
[W]henever any country, dependency, or colony shall pay or bestow, directly or
indirectly, any bounty or grant upon the exportation of any article or merchan-
dise from such country, dependency, or colony, and such article or merchandise
is dutiable under the provisions of this Act, then upon the importation of any
such article or merchandise into the United States . . .there shall be levied and
paid, in all such cases, in addition to the duties otherwise imposed by this Act, an
additional duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the
same be paid or bestowed.
Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205 (codified as amended at 19
U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)).
44. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The current revision of section 303 represents the sixth reenactment of the 1897
provision without any major changes. Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 11, 85
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)) (adding only "province or other
political subdivision" after "colony"); Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IV(E), 38 Stat. 114,
193 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)) (retaining the language of
section 6 of the Tariff Act of 1909); Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858,
935 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)) (adding "person, partner-
ship, association, cartel, or corporation" after "political subdivision of government" and
changing "any article or merchandise from such country" to any article or merchandise
"'manufactured or produced in such country"); Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46
Stat. 590, 687 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)) (retaining the
language of prior legislation with minor changes); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
618, § 303, 88 Stat. 1978, 2049 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)
(1982)) (deleting "any" before "such article or merchandise," and deleting "addi-
1988]
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cut concluded that the failure of Congress to address this issue in its
subsequent amendments to the statute constituted strong proof that
Congress intended to limit these disputes to the antidumping provisions
of the Trade Act.45 In essence, the court stated that because subse-
quent amendments fail to mention NMEs specifically, the statute
should not apply to such countries.4
Second, the court held that the intended purpose of the counter-
vailing duty remedy was inconsistent with the nature of NMEs47 be-
cause petitioners use this remedy to offset unfair competitive advan-
tages arising from government-based subsidies.4 8 Because the state
controls the market forces, the court determined that a NME govern-
ment could not convey subsidies.49 If the Soviet Union or German
Democratic Republic had sold its product directly rather than through
a government instrumentality, the product probably would sell at a
higher price.50 The court, therefore, concluded that the government of
a NME technically cannot subsidize a company because this action is
actually a "subsidy of itself." 1
The court also considered congressional action regarding import re-
lief. Congress specifically addressed NMEs in its antidumping amend-
ments in 1974 and 1979, but failed to make similar revisions with re-
spect to the countervailing duty laws. 2 The court concluded that
congressional inaction clearly indicated that the legislature intended to
use the antidumping law to protect the United States market from un-
tional" before "duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant"); Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 103, 93 Stat. 144, 190 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)) (making various revisions, none of which related to
NMEs).
45. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1315-16.
48. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978) (dis-
cussing countervailing duties as related to nonexcessive tax remissions).
49. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1986); see also G.M. PICKERSGILL & J.E. PICKERSGILL, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 208, 232-33 (1974) (comparing NME and market
economy systems).
50. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1316-17; see Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2043(1975) (amending the antidumping law to deal specifically with exports from NMEs
without amending the countervailing duty law to do the same) (repealed 1979); Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 184 (amending the an-
tidumping law to deal more effectively with NMEs, again without amending the coun-
tervailing duty law to do the same) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982)).
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fairly subsidized NME exports. 3
Congress approved the subsidies code in the Trade Agreements Act
of 197951 to implement GATT. The code provided that signatory coun-
tries may regulate imports from NMEs with either the countervailing
duty or antidumping legislation.55 The court, however, concluded that
the signatories advocated these two measures to permit each country to
make its own choice with respect to the appropriate remedy. In essence,
the court held that the remedies were mutually exclusive - a country
must choose one or the other, not both."' In the United States, the
court found, Congress chose to use the antidumping law instead of the
countervailing duty law. 7
Third, the court found that a "subsidy" is a distortion of the market
and, therefore, if no market exists, no subsidy can exist."8 The court
held that because this case concerned a NME, no subsidy existed.,
The court concluded that the countervailing duty law did not apply to
the NME imports in Georgetown Steel.60
III. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
The analysis of the court of appeals was flawed. The court's analysis
disregarded the plain and manifest meaning of the countervailing duty
statute and instead instituted a major exception to the countervailing
duty law. Examination of pertinent case law, legislation, and legislative
history illustrates that the decision in Georgetown Steel was unfounded.
A. CASE PRECEDENT
No prior cases have dealt specifically with the countervailing duty
law as applied to NMEs. In analyzing the decision of the court, there-
fore, it is necessary to examine cases involving economic structures that
are similar functionally, if not nominally, to those of NMEs. In two
previous cases, the court enforced the countervailing duty law when
central governments exercised a degree of control analogous to govern-
53. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
54. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties of 1979, 31 U.S.T. 513,
T.I.A.S. No. 9619, GATT BISD, 26th Supp. 56 (1980) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2503(c)(5) (1982)) [hereinafter Subsidies Code].
55. Id. art. 15.
56. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317-18 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
57. Id. at 1318.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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ment transactions concerning NMEs.6'
In Downs v. United States, the Russian government imposed a tax on
all sugar produced domestically, but remitted the tax for all sugar ex-
ported. 62 At the time, the Czar governed and regulated the entire in-
dustry.63 The United States Supreme Court, notwithstanding the politi-
cal structure of Russia, held that the tax remittance constituted
preferential treatment providing a reward or gratuity to all sugar
exporters.8 4
In British Steel Corp. v. United States, the court held that although
the British government owned 100% of the corporation, the invest-
ments of the United Kingdom in the steel corporation constituted "sub-
sidies" requiring the imposition of countervailing duties."' Although
these cases did not involve NMEs per se, the economic structures of
those countries were similar to the structures of NMEs because the
market had a high degree of regulation.66 Despite the extensive amount
of government regulation, the court still determined that the bounty
constituted a countervailable subsidy.
The economic systems, as related to the exported entity of the coun-
tries party to Downs and British Steel Corp., are similar to that in
Georgetown Steel. In each of the prior cases, the government com-
pletely dominated the respective industry, thereby stifling "true" mar-
ket forces. Based on Downs and British Steel, the exporting country is
not a determinative factor for establishing the existence of countervail-
able subsidies. Rather, it is an artificial dichotomy created for admini-
strative ease. Thus, countervailing duty determinations are possible in
61. See Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 516 (1903) (holding that a subsidy
conveyed in an economy governed by a czar is countervailable); British Steel Corp. v.
United States, 605 F. Supp. 286, 297 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (stating that the invest-
ments of the United Kingdom government in a British steel corporation that it wholly
owned constituted subsidies and were therefore countervailable).
62. Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496, 511 (1903). After exporting sugar to
the United States, the Russian government released the export from payment of an
excise tax that it imposed if the exporter had sold the sugar domestically. Id. The
Russian government also issued to the exporter a certificate, having a substantial mar-
ket value, certifying that he had exported a quantity of so-called free sugar. Id. Sugar
manufacturers use these certificates to transfer from their free surplus to their free
sugar an amount of sugar equal to the amount exported. Id. This method allows them
to pay half of the owed tax on the sugar. Id.
63. Id. at 498.
64. Id. at 516.
65. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 286, 297 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985).
66. See id. at 289 (stating that direct government payments to British Steel Corpo-
ration were essential to the survival of the company); Downs v. United States, 187 U.S.
496, 516 (1903) (noting that the Czar regulates the entire sugar industry through lim-
iting output on the domestic market and putting a premium on exportation).
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countries with a high degree of regulation and control.
It is apparent from Downs and British Steel Corp. that the court was
unwarranted in concluding that a NME government confering a sub-
sidy is actually "subsidizing itself."' 7 In both Downs and British Steel
Corp., the foreign government conveyed subsidies to a company it
wholly owned, and yet the court determined that a countervailable sub-
sidy existed. Again, the type of economic system in no way affected this
determination.
B. STATUTORY GUIDELINES
1. Intent of the Countervailing Duty Law
In addition to overlooking relevant case law, the court of appeals also
disregarded the statutory meaning of the countervailing duty law.68
The position of the court differs from the plain meaning and purpose of
the law. 9 In addition, it contradicts congressional70 and judicial17 inter-
pretations of the countervailing duty law.
The countervailing duty law distinguishes only types of subsidies, not
economies.72 The language of the law is clear and its purpose obvious.7 3
The law states that whenever any country bestows a bounty or grant to
a manufacturer, the government shall levy a duty equal to the net
amount of such bounty or grant. 4 The Supreme Court has held that
67. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (noting that because the state controls the industry, including when and what
the companies will sell, the government cannot subsidize the company as it would, in
effect, subsidize itself).
68. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982) (providing the language of the countervailing
duty law); INT'L TRADE COM'N, ITC ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1979) [hereinafter ITC
ANNUAL REPORT] (discussing the statutory meaning of the countervailing duty law);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1978) (noting that the
legislature wanted the countervailing duty law to offset unfair trade).
69. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982) (providing the language of the countervailing
duty law); ITC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 3 (indicating that the law was
enacted to curtail unfair trade).
70. See generally ITC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 68, at 3 (stating that Congress
created the countervailing duty statutory scheme to prevent foreign nations from en-
gaging in unfair trade practices).
71. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1978) (noting
that the purpose of the act was to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign
producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies their governments paid).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982). Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 refers to "any
country." Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687 (current version at 19
U.S.C. § 1303 (1982)). There is no qualifying term in the statute that would lead one
to conclude that the country must have a market economy.
73. See supra notes 69-71 (discussing the purpose of the countervailing duty law).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(1) (1982).
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the language of a statute determines its scope.75 The Supreme Court
has also held that unless legislative history expresses a contrary mean-
ing, the language of the statute is conclusive.71 Under this mode of
statutory interpretation, the countervailing duty statute unequivocally
applies to NMEs because the language of the statute is indifferent to
economic structures."
The legislative history indicates that the intent of this statute is to
protect domestic industry from unfair import pricing.78 Courts have re-
iterated this position when addressing the purpose of the law.79 The
presence of a market or NME is thus irrelevant. According to conven-
tional modes of statutory construction, the court incorrectly interpreted
the statute.
2. Recent Legislative Actions
The court of appeals also placed great weight on recent legislative
actions. The court indicated that under these amendments,80 courts
should apply the antidumping law to NME exports traded at an unfair
price.8' This finding was also conclusory and lacks support.
75. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983).
76. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980).
77. See supra notes 69-71 (discussing the purpose of the countervailing duty law);
Sandier, supra note 5, at 771 (stating that the countervailing duty statute applies on its
face to any country).
78. See ITC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69, at 3 (stating that the purpose of the
statute was to prevent foreign nations from engaging in unfair trade practices); see also
Note, Protecting Steel, supra note 3, at 868 (stating that Congress premised the coun-
tervailing duty law on the idea that the United States should permit competition from
imports only if the competition is fair).
79. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 444 (1978) (stating
that both the statutory language and the legislative history of the Act support the no-
tion that the countervailing duty serves to offset the competitive advantage that foreign
producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies from their governments); Ge-
orgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting
that the purpose of the law is to protect United States firms from unfair competition);
Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 553 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985)
(stating that the only purpose of the countervailing duty law is to extract subsidies
from foreign merchandise entering the country to protect domestic industries from
their effect), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
80. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316-17 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (discussing the 1974 and 1979 amendments to the antidumping law, the ap-
proval of the subsidies code, and the enactment of section 406). The court reviewed the
1974 and 1979 amendments to the trade statutes. Id. The statutory changes led the
court of appeals to believe that Congress intended only the antidumping statute to ap-
ply and not the countervailing duty law. Id. at 1318.
81. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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Congress expanded the antidumping law in the Trade Act of 197482
to deal specifically with NMEs. Congress concurrently amended the
countervailing duty law, 3 but did not distinguish between nonmarket
and market economies. According to the court, the silence of Congress
represented an unequivocal statement that the countervailing duty law
does not apply to exports from NMEs.8 ' This reasoning would allow
courts generally to emasculate any statute when the legislature amends
a related statute. Because no express language in the amendments spe-
cifically addressed the countervailing duty law8" and the "true mean-
ing" of the antidumping amendments,"8 the court should have deter-
mined the scope of the statutes through an analysis of the statutory
language.
The court also concluded that congressional approval of the Subsi-
dies Code in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Code) 88 indicated
that Congress chose the antidumping law over the countervailing duty
law. 9 The language of this Code, however, provides any signatory
country with an option to use either the countervailing duty law or the
antidumping law.90 In addition, Congress knew that countries with
NMEs had participated in the preparation of the Code and that two
such countries signed it.9' Congress, therefore, intended to give United
States companies a choice between the two laws. Again, the analysis of
the court with respect to this point is arbitrary and not in accordance
82. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2047-48 (1975)
(current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
83. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331(a), 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-50
(1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982)).
84. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
85. See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2043-49
(1975) (repealed 1979) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1673-1677 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)) (evidencing the omission of any mention of state-controlled economies in the
amendments to the countervailing duty statute).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191-92, reprinted in 1984 US.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4910, 5220 (noting that the true meaning of the an-
tidumping statute of section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 and the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984 is uncertain).
87. See North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983) (stating that
absent a clearly expressed intent to the contrary, the statute itself is controlling).
88. 19 U.S.C. § 2503 (1982).
89. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
90. Subsidies Code, supra note 54, art. 15 (providing a signatory country with the
choice of using the countervailing duty law or the antidumping law for imports from a
country with a state-controlled economy).
91. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 556-57 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
1988]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
with the law.
The court of appeals gave no valid legal reason why the counter-
vailing duty law should not apply to NMEs. The court struggled with
its analysis, finally resolving the issue through judicial fiat. Instead of
postulating possible reasons why the law should not apply, the court
instead stated that the failure of Congress to address the issue repre-
sented a clear indication that the countervailing duty law cannot apply
to NMEs. 2 To assume that "inaction" means "action" is as backward
logically as it is semantically. The more logical approach to this situa-
tion is to presume that if Congress did not intend for the countervailing
duty law to apply to NMEs, it would have so stated.
3. The Definition of Subsidy
A serious problem in the analysis of the court of appeals concerns
the definition the court gave to the term "subsidy." The court of ap-
peals concluded that a subsidy is a distortion of the market and, there-
fore, if no market exists, no subsidy can exist.9 3 The court, however,
premised its finding that a country with a NME cannot convey a sub-
sidy on an unfounded and artificial distinction between economic forms.
None of the laws of the United States relating to international trade
defines the term "subsidy. '9 4 The court could have looked to various
practices the Treasury Department sets forth pertaining to subsidies.9
The recommendations of the Treasury Department do not refer to a
nonmarket/market distinction. It is therefore anomalous that the court
92. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
93. Id. at 1316. The court affirmed the administration's definition of subsidy as any
action that distorts or subverts the market process and results in a misallocation of
resources, encouraging inefficient production and lessening world wealth. Id. at 1315.
Although the court of appeals does not explicitly state the syllogism stated in the text,
it is apparent that the court based its entire rationale on it.
94. See Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1055-56 (noting the
absence of a statutory provision defining subsidy); see also ASG Indus. v. United
States, 467 F. Supp. 1187, 1192 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (noting that Congress has refrained
from defining bounty or grant).
95. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 84, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 381, 470 [hereinafter 1979 SENATE REPORT] (discussing vari-
ous activities the Treasury Department has determined to constitute subsidies). Among
the practices the Treasury has determined to be a bounty or grant are:
(1) Direct payments to exporters related to the export of merchandise; (2) exces-
sive rebates of indirect taxes on merchandise upon export of the merchandise; (3)
export financing at preferential rates; (4) rebates of indirect taxes which are not
directly related to the merchandise exported; and (5) the forgiveness of income
and social security taxes related to merchandise exported.
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of appeals derived an economy-based definition of subsidy. Further-
more, the alleged subsidies in this case were similar to the subsidies for
which the Treasury has set forth guidelines. 6 The court of appeals,
therefore, should have looked to the recommendations of the Treasury
Department for guidance rather than deriving its own definition of
subsidy.
All documented data supports an "economy neutral" definition of a
subsidy.97 The court's definition is, thus, incorrect, because it is pre-
mised on the notion that only a market economy can provide subsi-
dies. 8 Without explaining its conclusion the court held that a subsidy
cannot exist in a NME.99
Furthermore, it is important to note that the court foresaw no prob-
lem in determining fair market value 00 under the antidumping law 01
96. See Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (listing the subsidies about which the petitioner complained). The petitioners
alleged that manufacturers received foreign exchange rates on export sales that were
higher than the official rates, and direct price equalization payments on exports. Id. In
the case of the Soviet Union, the petitioners claimed that exporting entities retained a
portion of the hard currency earned on foreign sales. Id. Such actions are specific ex-
amples of what the Treasury deemed subsidies, illustrating the examples listed in sec-
tion 771(5) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982)(defining the term "subsidy" in the context of antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations). The examples include situations where the government provides capital,
loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations, or pro-
vides goods or services at preferential rates, grants funds or forgives debt to cover oper-
ating losses a specific industry sustains, or assumes any costs or expenses of manufac-
ture, production, or distributions. Id.
97. See 1979 SENATE REPORT, supra note 95, at 85, reprinted in 1979 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 471 (noting that a government or government entity, subdi-
vision, customs union, private party, or group of private parties, can provide a subsidy).
The report of the Senate Finance Committee on the 1974 Act stated, "In the long run,
United States interests will be served by an international agreement to eliminate subsi-
dies which distort world trade patterns and discriminate against United States sales
both at home and abroad." S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 183, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7186, 7321 [hereinafter 1974 SENATE RE-
PORT]; see also Rivers & Greenwald, The Negotiation of a Code on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures: Bridging Fundamental Policy Differences, 11 LAv & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1447, 1448-49, 1467-82 (1979) (discussing the definition of subsidies as
negotiated at the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations).
98. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir.
1986). The court stated that "[t]here is no reason to believe that if the Soviet Union or
the German Democratic Republic had sold the potash directly rather than through a
government instrumentality, the product would have been sold at higher prices." Id.
One good reason to believe prices would have been higher is that subsidies would not
have benefitted the exporting companies and, therefore, they could not have afforded to
sell the goods at such a low price. Instead of stating there is "no reason to believe," the
court should have stated the reasons to believe.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1317 (discussing the provisions under 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) for
determining the foreign market value of merchandise from NMEs for purposes of the
antidumping law).
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even though it held that it cannot measure a subsidy in a NME. 02 If
the agency can determine fair market value in an economy with no
market, it can measure a subsidy within that same country. If the ad-
ministration does not require a true market system to determine fair
market value under the antidumping law, it should not impede the cal-
culation of a subsidy under the countervailing duty law. 0 3
In addition, the term "subsidy" as applied to export activities in
NMEs does not present any real difficulties of meaning. The subsidized
transactions the petitioners alleged in Georgetown Steel are not unique
to NMEs. Rather, they are easily identifiable government preferences,
similar to those existing in other types of economies.104 To establish the
existence of subsidies from NME governments, one need only establish
patterns of disproportionate or unfair treatment.' 5 Potential difficulties
are inevitable; 10 6 nevertheless, they do not justify the exception to the
law that the court sought in this case.
The difficulty inherent in determining the existence of subsidies for
NME exports is essentially one of measurement, not meaning.107 The
answer to this determination is not the elimination of the statute's
meaning, but a refinement of its application and measurement. The ra-
tionale of the court, thus, was flawed and conclusory. The court never
addressed the critical issue: protecting United States industry without
stifling international trade. Although the issue was a political one with-
101. See id. (stating that Congress enacted the antidumping law to protect domes-
tic industries from injury the imports from NMEs caused).
102. Id. at 1316.
103. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 548, 555 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
104. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 829 (stating that the definition of the
term "subsidy" hinges on preferentiality). If the government treats a group to the ad-
vantage of the group, the government conveys a subsidy. Id. This approach is workable
in both market and NMEs. Id.; see Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 614 F.
Supp. 548, 554 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985) (establishing the authority and ability of the
Commerce Department to detect patterns of regularity and investigate deviations from
those patterns regardless of the type of economy), rev'd sub nom. Georgetown Steel
Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1986). All systems have an inherent
pattern or structure inherent in the continuation and existence of such systems. Id. The
Commerce Department, therefore, could detect an unfair event or subsidy in any eco-
nomic environment. Id. It violates common sense to believe that the Commerce Depart-
ment cannot detect favoritism toward the manufacture, production, or export of the
merchandise in a NME. Id. at 554-55.
105. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 818 (stating that, with respect to
NMEs, it is generally conceded that home market prices and costs are meaningless as a
source of fair value). Prices in NMEs constantly reflect political, economic, or bureau-
cratic factors rather than the more typical supply and demand forces. Id.
106. Id. at 817.
107. Id.
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out a simple resolution, the court should have acknowledged that a seri-
ous problem existed and that eliminating the countervailing duty rem-
edy was not the answer.
IV. GEORGETOWN STEEL'S EFFECT ON THE LAW
According to the court in Georgetown Steel, the countervailing duty
law does not apply to imports from countries with NMEs. Conse-
quently, the antidumping law'0 8 and section 406 of the Trade Act of
1974109 will become the operative remedies. Like the countervailing
duty statute, these laws also have several shortcomings. In light of the
court of appeals decision, however, these laws alone must accomplish
the national goal of successful international trade. This section of the
note will discuss the problems inherent in various alternatives and eval-
uate their probability for success.
A. ANTIDUMPING LAW
The Department of Commerce will issue an antidumping duty order
if it concludes that a country sells a particular class of imported mer-
chandise in the United States at prices less than "fair value."110 In the
1974 Trade Act, Congress amended the antidumping law to provide a
"surrogate country" reference point designed to assist the United
States in determining "fair value.""' Under the antidumping statute,
the ITA constructs the normal costs, expenses, and profit margins of a
similar product in a country with a market economy to determine the
foreign market value of goods NMEs export. 2 For example, to deter-
mine the price of an import from the Soviet Union, the ITA might
construct the value of a similar product in West Germany.
Although this method of handling imports has received support in
the international legal community, 1 3 academics in the United States
108. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
109. Trade Act of 1974, § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
110. See supra note 7 (describing the details of the antidumping statute).
III. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673, 1675 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In the 1974 Act, Congress
amended the antidumping statute to address specifically imports from NMEs. Trade
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 1978, 2047 (current version at 19
U.S.C. §§ 1673-1673g (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). Congress reasoned that the United
States could not rely only on the prices of the goods imported from NMEs because the
normal supply and demand forces do not exist. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 97,
at 174, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 7311. In 1979, Con-
gress reenacted the surrogate country amendment it had authorized in the 1974 Act.
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, 186 (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982)).
112. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
113. See generally Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 814 (discussing how other
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have criticized the approach for being too difficult and unpredictable in
its application. 114 Several factors contribute to the unpredictable nature
of the law. First, the administering agent has the exclusive authority to
choose the surrogate country. Thus, domestic as well as foreign produc-
ers cannot look reliably to one country as a reference point. This lack
of reliability results in a high degree of uncertainty and confusion' 1"
and ultimately might create a chilling effect on foreign trade.110
Second, problems in predicting the fair value further inhibit effective
administration of the law.117 Although the statute does not define the
countries address the dumping of NME imports). In the European Community (EC),
the normal value of the product is based on:
(a) the price at which the like product of a market economy third country is
actually sold:
(i) for consumption on the domestic market of that country or
(ii) to other countries, including the community; or
(b) the constructed value of the like product in a market economy third coun-
try; or
(c) if neither [(a) or (b)] provides an adequate basis, the price actually paid or
payable in the Community for the like product, duly adjusted, if necessary, to
include a reasonable profit margin.
Id.
Canada, like the EC, has a flexible approach to handling imports from NMEs. Id. at
816. Canada has proposed new legislation to implement the 1979 GATT Antidumping
Code. Id. The Canadian legislation is virtually identical to that of the EC. Id.
In Australia, authorities have more discretion in determining normal value. Id. at
812. The Minister of Finance, however, must attempt to use prices of similar goods
sold in a market country where the costs of production are similar to those in the
NME. Id.
114. See Caine, A Case For Repealing the Antidumping Provisions of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 13 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 681, 684 (1981) (criticizing the antidumping
law as too complex and uncertain in application). See generally Ehrenhaft, What the
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can]
[Will] [Should] Mean for U.S. Trade Policy, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1361,
1369-77 (1979) [hereinafter Can Will Should] (stating the time periods for decision
making and the complexity of cases will inhibit efficient administration of the law);
Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 817 (discussing the implementation problems with
the antidumping law); Ehrenhaft, The Treasury's Proposed Approach to Imports
From State-Controlled Economic Countries and State-Owned Enterprises Under the
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, in INTERFACE ONE: CONFERENCE PRO-
CEEDINGS ON THE APPLICATION OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAWS TO IMPORTS FROM STATE CONTROLLED ECONOMIES AND STATE OWNED ENTER-
PRISES 80-85 (D. Wallale, G. Sping, R. Rawson and B. McGill eds. 1980) [hereinafter
Ehrenhaft, Proposed Approach] (discussing the severe practical shortcomings in the
administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws).
115. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 817; Caine, supra note 114, at 684.
116. Caine, supra note 114, at 698. Antidumping proceedings are unpredictable
and inconsistent. Id. Many foreign producers and importers thus try to avoid this type
of investigation. Id. These considerations can have a chilling effect on the pricing of
goods. For example, an exporter might opt to increase prices rather than risk a legal
proceeding that would require disclosure of confidential information. Id. at 698-99.
117. See id. at 685 (discussing the problems in calculating fair value).
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term "fair value" explicitly," 8 a regulation of the Department of Com-
merce states that fair value is an "estimate of foreign market value."118
The Department of Commerce chooses a country with a market econ-
omy at a stage of development analogous to the NME country to deter-
mine this estimate. Constructed values of similar goods in the market
economy country determine the value of the NME product.1 20 Valua-
tion problems will undoubtably arise because this estimation involves
many variables.12 1 Again, this unpredictability is detrimental to both
foreign and domestic producers. No producer can reliably coordinate
pricing schedules because the producer cannot determine dumping
prior to a decision by the Department of Commerce.12 2
Third, the Department of Commerce has difficulty procuring critical
data from surrogate countries. 23 To conduct an efficient investigation,
the Department of Commerce must find producers, with no vested in-
terest in the case, who are willing to open their books to government
investigators of the United States. Many countries are reluctant to as-
sist the Department of Commerce.1 24 The United States, however, can-
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982) (containing no definition of fair value); id. §§
1671a-1671f (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (containing no definition of fair value).
119. 19 C.F.R. § 353.1 (1986); see also Sandier, supra note 5, at 763-64 (explain-
ing how the ITA determines antidumping duties); Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at
819-21 (providing an overview of how the ITA determines fair value, using a con-
structed value approach).
120. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 819, 820.
121. See Caine, supra note 114, at 685 (stating the serious problems involved in
determining fair value); Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 819 (discussing the valu-
ation problems attendant with using a surrogate country-constructed value approach).
See generally Can Will Should, supra note 114, at 1366, 1367 (stating that the ad-
ministering authority generally needs to make myriad adjustments to calculate foreign
market value).
122. See Caine, supra note 114, at 685 (detailing the complexity in the application
of the antidumping law); Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 817 (discussing the
uncertainty inherent in the antidumping law).
123. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 821; cf. Caine, supra note 114, at 698
(discussing the chilling effects of the antidumping law and the difficulty in its
application).
124. 'See Porcelain on Steel Cooking Ware from the People's Republic of China, 51
Fed. Reg. 36,419, 36,421 (ITA 1986) (final determination of sales at less than fair
value) (illustrating the unwillingness of a third country to comply with Commerce's
investigation); Certain Iron Construction Castings from the People's Republic of
China, 51 Fed. Reg. 9483, 9484 (ITA 1986) (final determinations of sales at less than
fair value) (detailing Commerce's inability to obtain necessary information from
targeted surrogate countries). In the Construction Castings case, the ITA determined
that Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Thailand were at similar levels of
economic development as China. Id. at 9484. None responded to the questionnaires the
ITA sent these countries. Id. at 9485. Because the countries did not cooperate, the ITA
had to select the relevant and necessary data from the "basket of countries" that export
that specific product. Id. The ITA then calculated the foreign market value on the
basis of the average F.O.C. values of castings imported into the United States from the
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not impose sanctions on the surrogate country for failure to comply.
Consequently, the ITA must conduct investigations without specific
data, causing inconsistent determinations that are difficult, if not im-
possible, for foreign countries to anticipate. 25
Thus far, the ITA has used the hypothetical constructed value ap-
proach sparingly.'26 The approach, therefore, has not been tested.27 As
a result of the Georgetown Steel decision, however, a concomitant in-
crease in the number of petitions filed may occur. Based on the
problems associated with surrogate country and fair value analysis, it
appears the statute cannot withstand the onslaught of constant
application.
Aside from administrative problems, the extreme protectionist nature
of the statute is detrimental to the United States economy.'2 8 The law
is antithetical to United States economic policy as it discourages price
competition when it imposes automatic sanctions on foreign imports
"basket of countries." Id.; see also Natural Bristle Paint Brushes and Brush Heads
From the People's Republic of China, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,812, 52,813 (ITA 1985) [here-
inafter Natural Bristle] (final determination of sales at less than fair value) (providing
another example where the Department of Commerce used a weighted average of
prices because it could not procure the necessary information directly). In this case,
Commerce used the F.A.S. price of all brushes imported into the United States. Id. at
52,815.
125. Natural Bristle, supra note 124, at 52,815.
126. E.g., Shop Towels of Cotton from the People's Republic of China, 48 Fed.
Reg. 37,055 (ITA 1983) (final determination of below fair value sales); Unrefined
Montan Wax from the German Democratic Republic, 47 Fed. Reg. 3579 (ITA 1982)
(early determination of antidumping duty); Unrefined Montan Wax from the German
Democratic Republic, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,555 (ITA 1981) (final determination of below
fair value sales).
127. See generally Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 825 (discussing the many
problems related to the hypothetical constructed value); Caine, supra note 114, at 686
(explaining the hypothetical constructive value approach to determining fair value).
128. Caine, supra note 114, at 702; see Ehrenhaft, Proposed Approach, supra note
114, at 360 (discussing the 1974 and 1979 amendments to the antidumping law and
the resulting negative effect on international trade). See generally Barshefsky, Mattice
& Martin, Government Equity Participation in State-Owned Enterprises: An Analysis
of the Carbon Steel Countervailing Duty Cases, 14 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 1101,
1122-23 (1983) (arguing that the Commerce Department should encourage industry
restructuring rather than protect domestic industry unnecessarily); Jackson, supra note
4, at 1572-74 (discussing the elaborate governmental system the United States uses to
regulate imports); Sidak, A Framework for Administering the 1916 Antidumping Act:
Lessons from Antitrust Economics, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 377, 388-89 (1982) (stating
that the antidumping statute is really an antitrust and not a protectionist statute and
that the current form of the antidumping statute results in significant social costs);
Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy In the Regulation of International Trade, 100 HARv. L.
REV. 546 passim (1987) (criticizing current trade laws and governments' excessive in-
volvement in international trade and proposing the elimination of unfair trade laws, i.e.,
the antidumping statute); Note, Protecting Steel, supra note 3, at 868-74 (discussing
the problems with the antidumping statute2 and proposing instead a nationalization
plan).
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that sell below fair value. Because the law requires only a minimal de-
gree of injury to find material injury,1 29 it provides United States com-
panies with a disincentive to modernize and become more efficient"3"
and an incentive to rely on the antidumping law.
The protectionist nature of the law, thus, negatively affects the
United States economy. A cost-benefit analysis of the antidumping law
shows that it is inadequate.13' Because the statute is difficult to imple-
ment effectively and could harm the economy,13 2 it is an impractical
solution to the current trade crisis.
B. SE CrION 406
The second remedy available to deal with injurious NME imports is
section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974.133 Congress designed this statute
to provide relief for domestic industries that imports from communist
countries adversely affect.'34 Under the statute, the President, the
United States Trade Representative, Congress, or specified private enti-
ties can petition the ITC to initiate proceedings.' 30 Congress, highlight-
ing the potential need for urgent assistance, authorized the President to
take immediate action when necessary, pending a formal investigation
and report to the ITC. 36
After the ITC determines the existence of a market disruption, it
reports the findings and recommendations to the President, who has
129. Caine, supra note 114, at 703. The requisite degree of injury, material injury,
is defined as "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant." 19
U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). In the legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the
antidumping statute, the committee stated the following with respect to the degree of
injury required to impose sanctions automatically: "Obviously, the law will not recog-
nize trifling, immaterial, insignificant or inconsequential injury. Immaterial injury con-
notes spiritual injury, which may exist inside of persons not industries. Injury must be a
harm which is more than frivolous, inconsequential, insignificant, or immaterial." 1974
SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 180, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 7317.
130. See Caine, supra note 114, at 718 (noting that the minimal degree of injury
necessary to reach an affirmative determination of material injury bestows windfalls of
protection on United States companies).
131. See id. at 726 (stating that the costs attendant to the antidumping law out-
weigh the social benefits).
132. Id. at 716-17.
133. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 406, 88 Stat. 1978, 2062 (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982)).
134. Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 617-18.
135. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(1) (1982). Additionally, the ITC can initiate an investi-
gation on its own. Id. The private entities who can petition the ITC to initiate proceed-
ings include "a trade association, firm, certified or recognized union, or group of work-
ers which is representative of an industry." Id. § 2251(a)(1).
136. Id. § 2436(c).
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sixty days to take action.137 If the President determines remedial action
is necessary, he or she can invoke certain remedies. 8 If the President
does not follow the ITC recommendations, Congress can reinstate the
ITC's recommendations by passing a concurrent resolution receiving a
majority vote in both houses.13
To date, section 406 has not been an effective remedy; no United
States petitioner has ever received relief under this provision.4 In
every case where the ITC found the requisite degree of injury, 41 the
President has refused to grant relief. In the most publicized case, the
1979 investigation involving Russian ammonia,142 the ITC found the
requisite injury. The majority of the ITC recommended that the Presi-
dent impose a three-year quota on Soviet ammonia imports.1 43 The
President, however, concluded that the imposition of a quota was not in
the best economic interest of the United States. 4 On January 18,
1980, however, the President reversed his previous decision and im-
posed an emergency one-year quota limiting Soviet ammonia im-
ports. 45 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979
most likely precipitated this change.146 After the ITC reinstituted the
case, it concluded that no market disruption had occurred and, thus,
dismissed the case.1 47
In addition to its political susceptibility, section 406148 presents
137. Id. § 2252(b).
138. Id. § 2436(a)(1).
139. Id. § 2253(a)(1)-(5).
140. Rosen & Benjamin, supra note 19, at 18, col. 1.
141. See 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982) (defining market disruption). Section
2436(e)(2) provides that market disruption exists whenever imports "are increasing
rapidly . . . so as to be a significant cause of material injury." Id.; see also Recent
Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 638 (discussing the requisite
standard of injury for a section 406 proceeding).
142. Anhydrous Ammonia from the U.S.S.R., 45 Fed. Reg. 27,570 (ITC 1980)
(report to the President) [hereinafter Anhydrous Ammonia]; see Recent Development,
Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 622-26 (providing an analysis of the Anhydrous
Ammonia case with regard to section 406 proceedings).
143. Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 142, at 27,570 (stating that in the initial
hearing, the majority found that a market disruption existed).
144. Id. (stating that the President rejected the ITC's recommendations because
such a finding was not in the nation's economic interest: at the time, the United States
was seeking detente with the Soviet Union); Memorandum for the Special Representa-
tive for Trade Negotiations, 15 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2221 (Dec. 17, 1979).
145. Proclamation No. 4714, 45 Fed. Reg. 3875 (1980).
146. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 625 (noting
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the embargo on grain shipments to the Soviet
Union, and the Soviet Union trade boycott of the International Longshoreman's Asso-
ciation may have caused the United States to reverse its position).
147. Proclamation No. 4714, 45 Fed. Reg. 3875 (1980).
148. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 625 (dis-
cussing the Anhydrous Ammonia case and the attendant political ramifications).
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problems with its statutory provisions.1 49 In particular, the ITC has
considerable difficulty in defining and determining (1) rapidly increas-
ing imports, (2) material injury, (3) threat of material injury, and (4)
causation."' 0 Inconsistent ITC statutory interpretations0 ' and a lack of
legislative assistance 52 have undermined the intended purpose of sec-
tion 406.153
The ITC must apply the statute consistently and establish explicit
guidelines to enable domestic industries to determine the availability of
relief under section 406. In addition, NME producers need these mea-
sures so they will know in advance the parameters of nondisruptive or
noninjurious importation.'" To date, section 406 remains an elusive
and inconsistent alternative to remedying market disruption. Unlike the
antidumping statute, however, this statute may eventually become an
efficient trade remedy if Congress provides the necessary assistance."-,
V. PROPOSAL
Although many individuals debate the issues concerning trade with
NMEs, few believe the current alternatives are optimal."' 0 Finding the
most efficient solution, however, is difficult because the variables in-
volved are numerous and complicated. For any proposed alternative or
modification to succeed, the ITC must apply the solution in a straight-
forward manner and must not infringe on underlying policy goals of
stimulating international trade and protecting United States industry
from unfair imports. The law must be strict enough to protect domestic
companies, yet flexible enough to promote international trade. With
these goals in mind, the most desirable solution is to modify section 406
and repeal the antidumping law.
149. See Canned Mushrooms from the People's Republic of China, 47 Fed. Reg.
55,336, 55,337-38 (ITA 1982) (discussing the statutory interpretation of material in-jury within section 406 and the distinction between "contributing cause" under the
antidumping statute and "significant cause" of section 406).
150. Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 629.
151. See id. at 630 (illustrating the ITC's inconsistent interpretation of section
406).
152. See id. (discussing the lack of legislative guidance in applying the statutory
criteria of section 406).
153. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 827 (discussing the purpose of sec-
tion 406); Sandler, supra note 5, at 785 (stating that Congress directed section 406 at
market disruption imports from communist countries); Recent Development, Relief
from Imports, supra note 19, at 617 (stating that Congress enacted section 406 be-
cause increasing imports from NMEs potentially cause market disruption).
154. Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 659.
155. See id. (discussing the potential effectiveness of section 406).
156. Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 830.
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Section 406 avoids the complexities and uncertainties of the an-
tidumping law. 157 With the proper amendments and changes, this stat-
ute can better accomplish the stated objectives of NME import legisla-
tion.1 58 This section (1) discusses why section 406 is preferable to the
antidumping law and concludes that Congress should repeal the latter
in favor of the former, and (2) proposes modifications to the current
version of section 406 that will improve its effectiveness.
A. REPEAL THE ANTIDUMPING LAW AND MODIFY SECTION' 406
Section 406 contains a more effective remedy than the antidumping
law for companies injured by NME imports that receive subsidies. Sec-
tion 406 does not involve complex price comparisons with foreign coun-
tries: it focuses solely on domestic data." 9 Thus, unlike the antidump-
157. See Caine, supra note 114, at 684 (discussing the unfair and uncertain nature
of the antidumping law); Tarullo, supra note 128, at 558 (criticizing current trade
laws); Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 817-18 (stating that the antidumping law is
unpredictable, unfair to trading partners, unreliable, and subject to abuse).
158. See Tarullo, supra note 128, at 549 (noting that Congress successfully
amended the trade laws to broaden their scope); Can Will Should, supra note 114, at
1362 (discussing the principles and objectives associated with the antidumping and
countervailing duty law).
159. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a) (1982) (outlining the criteria for determining
the existence of market disruption) and 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (defining market dis-
ruption) with 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1982) (setting out the standard for assessing injury
to domestic industry caused by increased imports from market economies). The section
406 material injury standard requires a lower level of injury than section 201 serious
injury. Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 142, at 27,575; see infra notes 199-201 and
accompanying text (discussing the material injury standard of section 406). Nonethe-
less, the ITC, in section 406 proceedings, looks to the same type of data it uses in
section 201 inquiries. Clothespins from the People's Republic of China, the Polish Peo-
ple's Republic, and the Socialist Republic of Romania, USITC Pub. No. 902, Inv. No.
TA-406-2, TA-406-3, TA-406-4, at 7-9 (ITC 1978) [hereinafter Clothespins]; see Re-
cent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 636-40 (citing the ITC's
practice of using the economic data provided in section 201 for section 406
proceedings).
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 is the provision under which entities, as defined
in 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1), can apply for relief from fairly-priced imports from market
economies. Under section 201, the ITC commences an investigation, upon the filing of
a petition, to determine whether a foreign country imports an article in such increased
quantities that the increased imports are a "substantial cause" of serious injury to do-
mestic industry. 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (b)(l). In making its determinations, the ITC consid-
ers relevant economic indicators, including:
(A) with respect to serious injury, the significant idling of productive facilities
in the industry, the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
reasonable level of profit, and significant unemployment or underemployment
within the industry;
(B) with respect to the threat of serious injury, a decline in sales, a higher and
growing inventory, and a downward trend in production, profits, wages or em-
ployment (or increasing underemployment) in the domestic industry concerned;
and
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ing statute, section 406 does not have problems with "fair value"
determinations, 60 procurement of data from foreign countries,"6 " selec-
tion of appropriate surrogate countries,6 2 and setting prices in an infla-
tionary era where exchange rates fluctuate.26 3
Section 406 is also preferrable to the antidumping law because it
does not unduly protect domestic industries. Section 406 contains a
more stringent causation standard6 " and requires presidential review
before the imposition of sanctions. The less protectionist nature of sec-
tion 406 will benefit the economy because it will indirectly force United
States companies to modernize and produce goods at a lower cost.'"'
(C) with respect to substantial cause, an increase in imports (either actual or
relative to domestic production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic
market supplied by domestic producers.
Id. § 2251(b)(2). But see id. § 1673 (1982) (stating the procedure implemented when
the administering authority determines that a country is selling foreign merchandise in
the United States at less than its fair value and a United States industry is materially
injured or threatened with material injury). In making its determination under the an-
tidumping statute, the ITC uses a surrogate foreign country to construct the value of
the relevant imported product. Id. § 1677b(c).
160. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982). Section 406 employs a material injury stan-
dard, which does not involve a fair value determination. Id.; cf. id. § 1673 (requiring a
fair value determination under the antidumping law).
161. See Horlick & Shuman, supra note 5, at 819-26 (providing a detailed discus-
sion of the problems and uncertainties involved in procurring data in trade cases).
162. See id. at 819-26 (providing a detailed discussion of the problems and uncer-
tainties involved with selecting a surrogate country under the antidumping statute).
163. See Caine, supra note 114, at 695 (explaining the problems involved when
there is a movement in exchange rates in the international currency market). Because
section 406 involves domestic data, and not foreign prices, this complexity does not
arise under section 406. See supra note 159 (discussing the economic criteria used in a
section 406 proceeding); see also Caine, supra note 114, at 721-24 (discussing the pref-
erability of the escape clause over the antidumping law).
164. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 7263; see Recent Development, Relieffrom Imports, supra
note 19, at 653 (defining the causation standard required under section 406). To find
market disruption, the ITC must find "material injury or threat thereof" and that im-
ports under investigation are a "significant cause" of the injury. Id. But see Caine,
supra note 114, at 707 (concluding that the causation requirement under the an-
tidumping law is minimal). Under the antidumping law, imports sold at a price less
than fair value determine material injury. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
The language of the statute, however, does not require that the imports cause or princi-
pally cause the injury. Id. Rather, the imports must mainly "contribute" to the injury.
Id. Thus, an industry can be struggling for a variety of reasons, all except one unre-
lated to the import trade investigation, and still be injured "by reason of" the imports.
Caine, supra note 114, at 707; see also Tarullo, supra note 128, at 611 (stating that
the current causality requirement of the antidumping law is weak).
165. See Note, Protecting Steel, supra note 3, at 866 (noting the negative impact
that foreign imports have on the steel industry). This article discusses alternatives for
the steel industry. Id. at 884-85. The two alternatives presented are (1) to allow the
market to slim down the industry and force out inefficient companies, and (2) to create
a nationalized policy that would shift resources away from the steel industry. Id.; see
also Tarullo, supra note 128, at 557-58 (concluding that a market correction approach
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In addition, section 406 is more judicially economical than the an-
tidumping law. Section 406 provides limited judicial review of presiden-
tial decisions.166 Thus, under section 406, a considerable reduction in
litigation of trade conflicts will result.
Finally, section 406 is preferable from a foreign policy standpoint
because the President will consider international consequences prior to
the imposition of sanctions.' 67 The President's oversight will provide as-
surance that domestic relief will remain compatible with international
objectives.' 68 This compatibility is particularly significant because
United States trade decisions have a significant impact on the entire
international market.6 9 In light of the foregoing considerations, section
406 is a preferable remedy for the injury that NME imports cause.
Consequently, Congress should repeal the antidumping law and modify
section 406 to resolve all disputes.
B. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS OF SECTION 406
Although section 406 is preferable to the antidumping law, it still
requires substantial modification to become an effective remedy.' 70
Currently, the congressional guidelines pertaining to the statutory cri-
teria are too uncertain, causing the ITC to interpret the statute incon-
sistently.' 7 ' To transform section 406 into an effective remedy, both
is inconsistent with the efficiency goals of a market model); Barshefsky, Mattice &
Martin, supra note 128, at 1101 (suggesting that to restructure the steel industry, Con-
gress should not impose countervailing duties on government subsidies directed at re-
modeling the steel industry).
166. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 619 n.18
(discussing the limited judicial review available following negative determinations of
the President or Congress). To date, no section 406 action has been appealed to the
courts. Id.
167. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251(c)(5) (1982) (noting that in making his or her decision,
the President shall consider international economic interests of the United States).
168. See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing the political signif-
icance of the decision not to impose sanctions at a time when the United States was
seeking detente with the Soviet Union); Jackson, supra note 4, at 1578-79 (explaining
the nonquantifiable costs of the import regulatory system). A system that depends
solely on statutory criteria is too inflexible to implement foreign policy effectively. Id.
at 1579.
169. See Chicago & S. Airlines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1948) (observing the significance of congressional and executive powers of the
United States government in international commerce); Trade Reform Act of 1973,
Part 2: Hearings on H.R. 10710 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 451-52 (1974) (noting the influential role of the United States in international
trade).
170. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 659 (con-
cluding that the lack of legislative guidance undermined the effectiveness of section
406).
171. Id.
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theoretically and practically, Congress should eliminate the increasing
rapidly criterion and provide objective indicators and guidelines to as-
sist the ITC in determining material injury and significant cause.172
1. Rapidly Increasing Imports
To reach an affirmative decision as to market disruption, the ITC
must determine that imports from a NME are increasing rapidly.17 3
Although this test is stricter than the increasing imports standard of
section 201,174 the legislative history does not explain the distinction. 17
Also, the current test has created significant problems because Con-
gress has not defined the relevant time period over which to measure
import growth.17 6
Even if Congress provides practical and effective parameters, it is
preferable to eliminate the increasing rapidly standard as a determina-
tive factor in deciding market disruption. Ironically, Congress initially
designed section 406 to protect domestic industry from excessive dump-
ing or rapidly increasing imports from NME countries.177 At its incep-
tion, section 406 merely comprised one part of a tripartite system con-
sisting of section 406, the countervailing duty law, and the antidumping
law, to remedy injuries that NME imports caused .17  Because section
406 occupied a unique position within the previous framework, the in-
creasing rapidly standard was acceptable. The Georgetown Steel deci-
sion, however, eliminated the countervailing duty law as an available
means of relief.17 9 If Congress eliminated the antidumping law, section
406 would occupy a new role as the sole remedy for relief from the
injury that NME imports cause.
Consequently, the "rapidly increasing" standard would be impracti-
172. See id. at 637-53 (discussing the confusion involved in applying the statutory
requirements of section 406).
173. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982); 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 111,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 7263; see Recent Develop-
ment, Relieffrom Imports, supra note 19, at 629 (analyzing the definition and applica-
tion of the "increasing rapidly" standard).
174. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982).
175. Certain Gloves from the People's Republic of China, USITC Pub. No. 867,
Inv. No. TA-406-1, at 5 n.l (1978) [hereinafter Certain Gloves].
176. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 629 (noting
that the "language of section 406 and its legislative history do not indicate the appro-
priate time period to measure import growth").
177. See id. at 617 (explaining the reasons Congress enacted section 406).
178. See Comment, Import Relief Options, supra note 1, at 1051-52 (stating that
the countervailing duty law, the antidumping law, and section 406 sought to remedy
injury from NME imports).
179. Georgetown Steel Corp. v. United States, 801 F.2d 1308, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
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cal and would impede the effectiveness of the law. There are two main
shortcomings of the increasing rapidly standard. First, this standard
causes difficulty in measurement. 180 Second, the standard prevents im-
position of the law in instances when it is otherwise necessary. 181
a. Measurement Problems
Neither section 406 nor the legislative history definitively indicate
the relevant time period used to measure import growth.1 82 Measure-
ment problems will result because different reference points will deter-
mine whether there is an increase in imports. 183 In the Chinese Work-
gloves case, the ITC made a comparison based on two discrete time
periods.18 4 In concluding that imports were not increasing rapidly, the
commissioners compounded import levels from 1972 to 1975.185
In a later case, Clothespins,"" the commissioners first undertook the
strategy employed in Chinese Workgloves.'87 Using this method, the
ITC found imports to be increasing rapidly as they grew from 281,000
gross in 1973 to 506,000 gross in 1977,188 an increase of approximately
eighty percent. The commissioners, however, then shifted their focus to
the time period between 1975 and 1977.189 Using this time frame, they
determined there was a gradual rather than a rapid increase. 190
In addition to determining the relevant time period, the ITC has also
encountered problems because it lacks historical data for its cases." 1
The Senate Finance Committee report suggests that historic trade level
factors may determine whether imports are increasing rapidly.?' 2 In
180. Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 629.
181. See Certain Gloves, supra note 175, at 1 (holding that imports were not in-
creasing rapidly); Clothespins from the People's Republic of China, the Polish People's
Republic and the Socialist Republic of Rumania, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,757, 35,757 (ITA
1978) (finding that a market disruption existed with respect to the People's Republic of
China, but not with respect to Poland or Romania); see also Recent Development,
Relief from Imports, supra note 19 (analyzing the ITC decisions with regard to the
availability of relief from imports under section 406 proceedings).
182. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 629-33 (dis-
cussing the appropriate time period in light of past cases).
183. See id. at 632 (illustrating how different results are reached through using
different time periods as reference points).
184. Certain Gloves, supra note 175, at 11-12.
185. Id.
186. Clothespins, supra note 159, at 6-7.
187. Id. at 19.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 142, at 27,571 (noting the lack of his-
torical data with respect to trade levels).
192. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 212, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
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three cases where a majority concluded that imports were increasing
rapidly, no historical data was available to compare present imports."9 3
In addition, the commissioners remarked about the problems that exist
in determining whether imports are increasing rapidly when historical
data is unavailable."'9 The ITC has encountered substantial difficulty
with this standard. Therefore, to administer import trade legislation ef-
fectively, the ITC should eliminate this nebulous requirement.
b. The Increasing Rapidly Standard Can Prevent Invocation of the
Law When it Is Otherwise Necessary.
Companies must satisfy the statutory provisions of section 406,
which requires imports to be increasing rapidly before companies can
request the President to review the situation."" For example, in Chi-
nese Workgloves, the ITC held that imports were not increasing rap-
idly, thereby denying the company presidential review.9 0 Thus, even if
the ITC had found that the domestic industry suffered a material in-
jury and the company satisfied all the other statutory requirements, the
statute still would have precluded the company, although injured, from
seeking relief.1 97
The increasing rapidly standard also does not encompass the possibil-
ity of NME manufacturers drastically reducing the price of exports. 9 8
For example, if producers significantly reduce the price of their goods
and still maintain a steady export level, United States companies can-
not obtain relief because the imports are not increasing rapidly. Again,
although material injury might exist, companies will not obtain relief.
2. The Material Injury Standard
The language of section 406 and the legislative history do not help
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 7343.
193. See Anhydrous Ammonia, supra note 142, at 27,571 (noting the lack of his-
torical data with respect to imports).
194. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 633 (dis-
cussing the absence of historic trade levels in determining whether imports are increas-
ing rapidly, and citing the Anhydrous Ammonia and Clothespins cases).
195. See supra note 140-41 and accompanying text (noting that no companies have
received relief from a section 406 proceeding).
196. Certain Gloves, supra note 175, at 1.
197. See 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982) (stating that for market disruption to ex-
ist, the ITC must find, in addition to material injury, that imports are increasing
rapidly).
198. See generally Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at
633 (discussing the problems with the statutory language of section 406).
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clarify the term "material injury."1 9 Apparently, however, the mate-
rial injury standard is a lesser guide than the serious injury standard of
section 201.200 Unfortunately, this difference is based on the extent of
the legislative guidance. Consequently, the ITC encountered considera-
ble difficulty in determining material injury.20 1
Congress should provide objective indicators similar to those under
section 201202 to assist the ITC in determining material injury.20 3 Sec-
tion 201 instructs the ITC to consider such factors as the idling of pro-
duction facilities in the industry and the inability of significant num-
bers of companies to operate at a reasonable profit level and significant
employment within the industry.0 4 These indicators are helpful, yet
they are equivocal and need modification with respect to percentile ref-
erence points. For example, a ten percent benchmark percentage rate
can apply to unemployment. The quantitative guidelines, although un-
rigid, might assist the ITC in reaching consistent determinations.
3. Causation
The appropriate causation standard under section 406 is "significant
cause."20 5 Although section 406 does not define the standard,06 it ap-
pears that the "significant cause" occupies a middle position between a
"substantial cause" standard and "contribute importantly" require-
ment.20 7 Once again, the ITC has experienced difficulty in interpreting
this statutory requirement. 0 8 To clarify this standard, Congress should
199. H.R. REPORT No. 93-571, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. at 82 (1973); 1974 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 97, at 212, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 7343.
200. Id.
201. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 639 (dis-
cussing the problems the ITC encounters when it determines material injury).
202. Trade Act of 1974 §§ 201-03, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1982). Congress
designed the escape clause of section 201 to provide temporary relief for an industry
suffering from serious injury or threat thereof from fairly priced imports, so that the
industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international competition. 1974
SENATE REPORT, supra note 97, at 119, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws at 7186.
203. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1982).
204. Id. § 2251(b)(2)(A).
205. Id. § 2436(e)(2).
206. Id.
207. Id. § 2251(b)(4). The statute defines "substantial cause" as a cause which is
important and not less important than any other cause. Id. The statute also defines
"contribute importantly" as a cause that is important, but not necessarily more impor-
tant than any other cause. Id. §§ 2272, 2341(c), 2371(c); see also Recent Develop-
ment, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 654 (suggesting that "significant cause"
occupies a middle ground between "substantial cause" and "contribute importantly").
208. See Certain Gloves, supra note 175, at 7 (illustrating the difficulty in applying
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explicitly define the phrase "significant cause" and provide guidelines
that the ITC could consider in reaching its decision.
In previous cases where the ITC has determined imports caused the
injury, the commissioners focused on the decrease in domestic sales as
a result of imports, the price of imports vis-A-vis domestic goods, and
the market share of foreign goods.209 With respect to material injury,
quantitative parameters might provide a helpful reference point for the
commissioners. This method is not intended as a rigid mathematical
equation; rather, it is intended to assist the commissioners in determin-
ing causation consistently.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Georgetown Steel disregarded the plain meaning of
the countervailing duty statute, relevant legislative history, and case
law. The holding of the court eliminated the applicability of the coun-
tervailing duty law to imports from NMEs, leaving only the antidump-
ing law and section 406 to protect domestic interests. Currently, neither
alternative is effective. The antidumping law is too unpredictable and
difficult to administer, while section 406 is unduly vague and ambigu-
ous. Congress should repeal the antidumping law and modify section
406 with statutory guidelines and reference points to resolve efficiently
the problem of a remedy for injuries caused by NME imports.
Certainly, the task of formulating United States trade remedies is
complex, and the best solution will still contain imperfections. Never-
theless, Congress should create new laws or modify old ones. The cur-
rent remedies have resulted in confusion and disarray.
the vague statutory criteria of section 406); Recent Development, Relieffrom Imports,
supra note 19, at 654 (discussing the problems of the causation standard of section
406). But see Clothespins, supra note 159, at 24-25 (noting that other causes contrib-
uting to the injury of the industry do not preclude a finding that the imports signifi-
cantly caused injury).
209. See Recent Development, Relief from Imports, supra note 19, at 659 (dis-
cussing the focus of the section 406 investigations by the ITC).
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